Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

Auteur: Bortolotti, Lisa (University of Birmingham)
Editeur: Oxford University Press
Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.

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Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.
ISBN / EAN 9780198863984
Auteur Bortolotti, Lisa (University of Birmingham)
Editeur Oxford University Press